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We develop a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making which suggests 
that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval, consistent with 
Krehbiel’s (1998) study of US politics.  This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference 
configuration of the political actors; and (2) the legislative procedures in a particular period.  
Actors’ preferences and the procedures are not expected to have any effect beyond their impact 
on the gridlock interval.  We predict smaller gridlock intervals, and thus more legislative activity, 
when the pivotal member states and the European Parliament and/or EU Commission are closer 
to each other.  We also predict smaller gridlock intervals under the codecision than the 
consultation procedure and under qualified-majority voting in the Council than under unanimity.  
We find empirical support for these propositions in an empirical analysis of EU legislative 
activity between 1979 and 2009. 
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One of the aspirations of political scientists and economists is to explain policy.  Spatial models 
are a useful tool in this endeavor.  In these models, policies typically depend on the preferences of 
the political actors.  For example, the outcome of a legislative debate on deficit reduction can be 
expected to be different if all legislators favor spending cuts over tax hikes, as opposed to the 
other way around. The institutional rules also affect policies.  They include such aspects of policy 
making as the legislative procedures and voting rules, the roles of the political actors, and the 
policy dimensions that are under consideration.  If consensus rather than a simple majority is 
required, for example, agreeing on spending cuts is likely to be more difficult.   
As in the study of legislative politics generally, spatial models have become a standard 
approach to study policy making in the European Union (EU).  Steunenberg (1994), Tsebelis 
(1994), Crombez (1996, 1997, 2001), Moser (1997) and Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), amongst 
others, have presented spatial models of the EU legislative process.  Thomson et al.  (2006) and 
Thomson (2011) have tested these and other theories.  Spatial models have also been used to 
study other aspects of EU politics, albeit less often.  The Commission appointment process, for 
example, has been formally analyzed by Crombez and Hix (2011).   
In this paper we focus on legislative activity in the EU and the absence thereof, or 
‘gridlock’.  Legislative activity during a period of time is measured by the number of pieces of 
legislation that are adopted.  We do not seek to explain what specific policies emerge from the 
political process, but rather we study under what conditions we can expect more or less 
legislative activity.  These conditions relate to the two variables we mentioned above: actors’ 
preferences, and institutional rules.   
Our approach is similar to that used by Krehbiel (1998) to study United States law 
making.  He found that legislative activity in the United States is a function of the width of the 
‘gridlock interval’: the set of policies that cannot be changed in the legislative process, because 
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the key political actors cannot agree.  The status quo prevails if it is in the gridlock interval.1  If 
the adoption of a policy requires the approval of two political actors, for example, the gridlock 
interval is the set of policies that are located between the two actors’ ideal policies.  If the status 
quo is in this set, each actor wants to move policy closer to his ideal, and thus farther away from 
the other actor, and rejects moves away from his ideal.  Gridlock then results.  The gridlock 
interval can be considered as a measure for the preference heterogeneity of the key political 
actors in a particular period.  The more diverse their preferences, the wider the gridlock interval, 
and the less legislative activity occurs under the assumption that the status quo is uniformly 
distributed over the policy space.  Krehbiel further argued that the mood of the electorate and the 
government regime, divided or united, have no impact on legislative activity when controlling for 
the width of the gridlock interval.  Our approach is similar, but what is of additional interest in 
the context of the EU are the changing procedural rules over the past three decades as a result of 
reforms of the EU Treaty. 
We hence develop a theory of legislative activity and gridlock in the EU and test it using 
data on legislation and political actors’ preferences for a thirty-year period, from 1979 until 2009.  
Gridlock in the EU has received little attention thus far in the literature.  Hertz and Leuffen 
(2011) have studied the impact of enlargement on the production of legislation in the EU and 
found that the effects of enlargement on gridlock are smaller than they expected.  Others have 
analyzed the impact of enlargement on the speed of EU decision making, a concept that is related 
to legislative productivity and gridlock (cf. König 2008, Golub 2008).  König (2007) found that a 
rise in the level of conflict in the Council, as measured by the distance between the policy 
positions of the two most extreme member states, increased the duration of the EU’s legislative 
process.   
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What is different about how approach is that rather than focus on the speed of the 
adoption of legislation, which has been extensively studied in existing research on EU legislative 
politics, we focus on the volume of legislation adopted in a particular period.  Put simply: does a 
larger (smaller) gridlock interval reduce (increase) legislative output?  Our theory predicts that it 
does.  What is more, our theory suggests that the institutional rules do not affect legislative 
activity beyond the impact they have on the gridlock interval.   
We make two simplifying assumptions to allow us to empirically test our theory: (1) that 
the policy positions of EU actors can be measured on a left-right dimension; and (2) that a single 
decision-making rule applies in a particular six-month period.  Each of these assumptions is 
problematic: there are at least two dimensions of EU politics (e.g. left-right, pro-/anti-Europe 
etc.); and different legislative rules (such as unanimity and qualified-majority voting) are used for 
different pieces of legislative in most periods.  Put another way, by making these two 
simplifications, our measurement of actors’ preferences and the applications of rules is certainly 
‘noisy’.  Hence, the results that we find – of a significant (inverse) relationship between gridlock 
size and legislative output, both across and within each institutional period of the EU – are 
probably at the lower bound of the true relationship.  This suggests that we have indeed 
discovered something new about how the EU works. 
In the next section we present our model of legislative activity in the EU.  In the third 
section we analyze how preferences and institutions affect this activity.  We then test our theory 
using data on actors’ preferences, rule changes and legislative activity in the 1979-2009 period.   
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A Model of Legislative Activity and Gridlock in the EU 
In this section we present a model of legislative activity in the EU, which builds on models of EU 
policy making introduced by Crombez (1996, 1997, 2001). 
 
Pivotal Actors and Procedural Rules 
The political actors in the model are the m member states, the Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs), and the Commissioners.  We assume that these actors care about policy and 
have Euclidean preferences.  That is, they have ideal policies and prefer policies that are closer to 
rather than farther away from these ideal policies.  Thus, they can be represented by points in an 
n-dimensional policy space P⊂ℜn.   
Since the actors have Euclidean preferences, their preferences over a policy issue are 
independent of the EU policies on other issues.  Member state k’s utility, for example, decreases 
as the EU policy on dimension i moves further away from its ideal policy on dimension i, 
whatever the EU policies on the other dimensions.  Since the EU uses strict germaneness rules 
EU policy making on dimension i can then be studied as if it were the only relevant dimension.  
For that reason we present one-dimensional models of policy making.2 
We assume that the European Parliament and the Commission use simple majority voting 
rules and that there are no restrictions on amendments.3  As a consequence, we focus on the ideal 
policies of the median Commissioner and the median MEP, as these are the pivotal actors under 
majority rule in one-dimension and open amendments (e.g.  Black, 1958).   
The Council is not represented as a unitary actor because it uses either QMV or unanimity 
for the adoption of legislation.  Nonetheless, the analysis of policy making can be simplified by 
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focusing on the member states that are pivotal under the QMV and unanimity rules.  Under the 
QMV rule, 255 votes out of a total of 345 are currently needed to defeat the status quo.4 The 
member state (b) that is pivotal for a rightward (leftward) move thus has an ideal policy to the 
left (right) of the member state with the median vote.  In particular, it is the member state with the 
91st (255th) vote from the left (right).  Under unanimity rule the two most extreme member states 
1 and m are pivotal. 
In sum, there are six potentially relevant actors in policy making: the Commission, as 
represented by the median Commissioner; the European Parliament, as represented by the median 
MEP; and the four pivotal member states 1, a, b and m.  The respective ideal policies of these 
actors are pc, pp, p1, pa, pb and pn.  Below we refer to member states a and b as the pivotal 
member states, and member states 1 and m as the extreme member states. 
We present an infinite-horizon model.  In each period t the EU may alter policy on one 
particular issue.  We assume for simplicity and without loss of generality that the Commission 
choses what issue to address in each period.  Policy on an issue is then set under one of the EU’s 
two main legislative procedures: consultation or codecision (since the Treaty of Lisbon called the 
‘ordinary legislative procedure’).  On the other issues the status quo prevails.  The procedure that 
applies to an issue is exogenously determined at the start of each period.  The procedure may 
change from one period to another due to Treaty changes.   
The preferences of the political actors are also exogenously assigned at the start of each 
period.  The actors’ preferences may be different from those in the previous period because 
political actors may have been voted out of office and replaced, for example.  We assume for 
simplicity that in period t political actors care about policy during that period only.  They do not 
care about policy in future periods.   
a
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The location of the status quo at the start of period 1 is exogenously given.  The location 
of the status quo at the start of period t>1 depends on the policy that was set in period t-1 and an 
exogenous shock that may have moved its location at the start of period t.  At the start of period t 
an exogenous shock S occurs with probability π.  Subsequently the Commission choses what 
policy issue to address.  The sequence of events that follows depends on the legislative procedure 
that applies.   
Under consultation the Commission first proposes a policy.  Next the Commission 
proposal is sent to the Council.  In the Council member states can propose amendments.  We 
assume for simplicity that only one MS k is selected to propose an amendment, and that it can 
decide whether or not to use that opportunity.  Amendments need unanimity in the Council for 
approval.  At the end of the procedure the (amended) proposal is voted on by the Council.  
Approval by a qualified majority in the Council is required for adoption.  If the proposal is 
adopted, it becomes EU law.  Otherwise the status quo prevails.  Figure 1 shows the sequence of 
events under consultation. 
 
Figure 1. The Sequence of Events under the Consultation Procedure 
 
 
MS k may propose an 
amendment. 
The MSs vote on the (amended) 
proposal (by qualified majority). 
 
The Commission formulates 
a proposal. 
The MSs vote on the 
amendment (by 
unanimity). 
MS = Member State 
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Under codecision the European Parliament proposes a joint text, as shown in the first step 
of Figure 2.5  If it is approved by a qualified majority in the Council, it is adopted. Otherwise, the 
status quo prevails.   
 
Figure 2. The Sequence of Events under the Codecision Procedure 
 The model incorporates complete and perfect information.  We use the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium concept.   
 
Consultation and Codecision 
We next look at the conditions under which the EU manages to adopt legislation in period t under 
each of the two main legislative procedures of the EU: consultation and codecision.   
Under consultation the Commission needs the support of a qualified majority in the 
Council for the adoption of its proposal in the last step of the procedure.  The Commission then 
focuses on the relevant pivotal member state, since any proposal which wins its support can be 
adopted in the Council.  If the Commission wants to move to the right (left) the relevant pivotal 
member state is member state a (b).  The Commission thus only considers the policies that this 
member state prefers to the status quo.   Not all proposals that are preferred to the status quo by 
the relevant pivotal member state make it to the last step of the procedure, however, because they 
can be amended by unanimity in the second and third steps of the procedure.  Such proposals that 
are to the left or right of the ideal policies of all member states are successfully amended, and the 
	
The EP proposes a joint text. 
The MSs vote on the joint text 
(by qualified majority). 
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amended proposal will be between the ideal policies of the two extreme member states.  When 
formulating its proposal in the first step of the procedure the Commission thus considers the 
policies that are preferred to the status quo by the relevant pivotal member state and that are 
between the ideal policies of the two extreme member states.  The Commission successfully 
proposes the policy it prefers most from this set of policies.   
So, under what circumstances does consultation lead to gridlock? Proposals need to be 
preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority for adoption.  If no policy is preferred to the 
status quo by a qualified majority, the status quo prevails.  If the status quo is to the right (left) of 
member state a (b), there is no qualified majority in favor of a move to the right (left).  That is, if 
the status quo is in the set [pa,pb], gridlock results.  The status quo may also prevail if there are 
policies a qualified majority in the Council strictly prefers to the status quo, but the Commission 
prefers the status quo to such policies.  This occurs if the status quo is between the ideal policies 
of the Commission on the one hand and the pivotal member states on the other hand: if pc≤SQ<pa 
or pb<SQ≤pc.  The Commission and the pivotal member states then want to move the status quo 
in opposite directions.  Hence, the status quo prevails in interval [min{pa,pc},max{pb,pc}], unless 
all member states want to move in the same direction away from the status quo.   
If all member states do want to move in the same direction, that is SQ<p1 or pn<SQ, they 
can successfully amend Commission proposals.  The gridlock interval under consultation is then 
equal to the interval GICONS=[min{pa,pc},max{pb,pc}]∩[p1,pn]=[max{p1,min{pa,pc}}, 
min{pn,max{pb,pc}}].  The status quo prevails if it is in this interval.  If the status quo is not in this 
interval, the EU is able to adopt legislation. 
Once EU policy on an issue has been set in period t, it cannot be altered in subsequent 
periods unless the actors’ preferences, the procedures or the status quo change.  To approve a new 
policy, support from either of two winning coalitions would be required:  (1) the Commission and 
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a qualified majority in the Council; or (2) a unanimous Council.  A unanimous Council cannot 
agree on another policy, however, because it would have approved a unanimously preferred 
policy as an amendment in period t, if there were one.  The Commission cannot find qualified 
majority support to move even farther from the status quo, because it would have proposed such a 
move in period t, if it could.  Moreover, the Commission does not want to move back toward the 
status quo because it would not have proposed to move as far in period t, if it did.   
Turning to codecision, in the last stage of the procedure a joint text requires approval by a 
qualified majority in the Council.  At the first stage, the European Parliament thus considers the 
policies that the relevant pivotal member state prefers to the status quo, and successfully proposes 
as a joint text the policy it prefers most from among these policies.   
Under what circumstances does codecision lead to gridlock? Proposals need to be 
preferred to the status quo by the European Parliament and a qualified majority in the Council for 
adoption.  If no policy is preferred to the status quo by the European Parliament and a qualified 
majority, that is, if the status quo is between the ideal policies of the European Parliament and the 
two pivotal member states, gridlock results.  The gridlock interval for an issue under codecision is 
then equal to the interval GICOD=[min{pa,pp}, max{pb,pp}].   
 
Determinants of Gridlock 
As discussed, our theory suggests that equilibrium policies depend on two main factors: actors’ 





In the previous section we determined the gridlock intervals for an issue in period t under 
consultation and codecision.  Under consultation, the gridlock interval widens as the pivotal 
member states are farther apart, and as the extreme member states and the Commission are farther 
away from the midpoint between the two pivotal member states’ ideal policies.  Under 
codecision, meanwhile, the gridlock interval expands as the pivotal member states are farther 
apart, and as the European Parliament is farther away from the midpoint between the two pivotal 
member states’ ideal policies.  More preference heterogeneity thus hinders legislative activity on 
an issue under both consultation and codecision.   
At the start of each period the Commission considers on what issues legislative activity is 
possible.  It then studies the equilibrium policies that will emerge on these issues, and the utility it 
will derive from those policies.  It chooses the issue that yield the largest utility increase, or 
smallest utility decrease, for itself.6 If the status quo is in the gridlock interval on each issue, no 
legislative activity occurs during the period.  There is thus less legislative activity and more 
gridlock in the EU if preferences are more heterogeneous.  This leads to the following testable 
hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 Legislative activity increases as the gridlock interval contracts.  The 
gridlock interval on dimension i contracts as (1) the ideal policies of the pivotal member 
states on that dimension are closer together, (2) the ideal policies of the Commission and 
(3) the extreme member states are closer to the midpoint between the pivotal member 
states’ ideal policies (under consultation), and (4) under codecision, the European 
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Parliament’s ideal policy is closer to the midpoint between the pivotal member states’ 
ideal policies. 
 
We now examine more closely how the preferences of the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the member states affect legislative activity. The Commission is appointed by the 
member state governments and the MEPs for a five-year term after each European Parliament 
election.  As new Commissioners take office, their preferences are likely to be different from 
those of their predecessors. Occasionally individual Commissioners are replaced during a 
Commission term.  Commissioners may also change their preferences during their terms.   
Since the Commission does not play a role in proposing the joint text or voting on it under 
codecision, legislative activity does not depend on its preferences under this procedure.  
However, under consultation it does.  Under consultation, if the old and the new Commission are 
both located between the two pivotal member states, the gridlock interval is not affected by the 
investiture of a new Commission.  But, if the old (new) Commission is located between the two 
pivotal member states, but the new (old) Commission is not, the gridlock interval weakly expands 
(contracts).  And, if neither the old nor the new Commission are located between the two pivotal 
member states, legislative activity weakly increases (reduces) if the new Commission is closer to 
(farther away from) the midpoint between the two pivotal member states.   
The European Parliament is directly elected for a five-year term.  A newly elected 
Parliament is likely to have different preferences from its predecessor.  As was the case for 
Commissioners, occasionally individual MEPs are replaced during their terms, and sitting MEPs 
may change their preferences after their election.  In our model, the preferences of the European 
Parliament do not affect legislative activity under consultation.  Under codecision, in contrast, the 
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effect of changing European Parliament preferences is the same as the effect of changes in 
Commission preferences under consultation. 
Finally, member states are represented in the Council by national government ministers.  
In contrast to the European Parliament and the Commission, the members of the Council are not 
all re-elected or reappointed at the same time.  Member state representatives change at various 
moments during a Commission’s term, whenever there is a change of government in a member 
state, as a result of national elections or the formation of a new government, or if there is a 
reshuffle of cabinet seats.   
A change in a member state’s preferences affects legislative activity only if it leads to a 
different preference configuration of the pivotal and extreme member states.  Such a different 
configuration emerges when one of the pivotal or extreme member states changes its preferences, 
while remaining pivotal or extreme, and also when another member state becomes pivotal or 
extreme as a result of a preference change.  In either case, the result of a change that affects the 
preferences of a pivotal member state is similar to the result of the changes in Commission or 
European Parliament preferences discussed above.7 The result of a change that affects the 
preferences of an extreme member state is straightforward: if the (possibly new) extreme member 
state is closer to the closer pivotal member state, legislative activity (weakly) increases.  
Otherwise it (weakly) reduces. 
 
Changes to Institutional Rules 
Table 1 shows the evolution of the EU’s legislative rules between the entry into force of Treaty of 
Rome and the end of 2009-14 European Parliament.  So, for example, between 1958 and 1986 the 
EU adopted legislation using the consultation procedure and unanimous agreement amongst the 
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then 9 member states in the Council.  The majorities in the Commission and the European 
Parliament were not relevant for determining the gridlock interval at that time.  Then, between 
July 1987 and October 1993, which was the period of the Single European Act (SEA), the EU 
adopted most legislation using the consultation procedure and QMV in the Council (which at that 
time was 54 out of 76 votes).  And, from the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 
November 1993, the codecision procedure has become the most important legislative procedure, 
which requires a qualified majority in the Council and a simple majority in the European 
Parliament.   
Whether there is more gridlock under the consultation or codecision procedures depends 
on the relative locations of the ideal policies of the European Parliament, the Commission and the 
pivotal and extreme member states.  If the European Parliament and the Commission are both 
located between the two pivotal member states, the extent of gridlock is the same under both 
procedures.  If the Commission is between the pivotal member states, but the European 
Parliament is not, the gridlock interval is wider under codecision than under consultation.  But, if  
the European Parliament is between the pivotal member states, but the Commission is not, then 
the gridlock interval is smaller under codecision than under consultation.  If neither the 
Commission nor the European Parliament are located between the pivotal member states, and the 
Commission, or the extreme member state that is at the same side of the pivotal member states as 
is the Commission, is closer to (farther from) the midpoint of the ideal policies of the pivotal 
member states than is the European Parliament, the gridlock interval is wider (smaller) under 
codecision.  Hence, our theory predicts that the introduction of codecision has an impact on 
legislative activity insofar as the introduction of the new procedure affects the size of the gridlock 
interval.  It does not predict any impact beyond that. 
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Even though the 1957 Treaty of Rome provided for QMV, in practice it was not used until 
the SEA.  Then, each subsequent Treaty extended its use.  There is more gridlock when 
unanimity is used than when QMV is used, both under consultation and codecision.  Under 
consultation, there is gridlock under unanimity if the status quo is between the ideal policies of 
the two extreme member states on that issue; if it is in the set [p1,pn].  This is a superset of the 
gridlock set GICONS under QMV.  Under codecision, there is additional gridlock under unanimity 
if the European Parliament is not between the ideal policies of the two extreme member states 
and the status quo is between the European Parliament and the extreme member states: The 
gridlock set is then [min{p1,pp}, max{pn,pp}], which is a superset of the gridlock set GICOD under 
QMV.  Thus our theory predicts that the move from unanimity to QMV has a positive impact on 
legislative activity, but does not predict any impact beyond that. 
 
Finally, it is often claimed that EU enlargement, ‘widening of the EU’, has made 
decision-making more cumbersome and led to a decrease in legislative activity.  Our theory 
predicts that the impact of adding more member states depends on the location of the ideal 
policies of these new member states.  If the gridlock interval expands as a result of their entry into 
the EU, legislative activity can be expected to decrease.  Otherwise it will increase.  For example, 
the gridlock interval expands in a policy area if unanimity is used and the new member states all 
have ideal policies that are to the left (right) of the old member states.  An increase in preference 
heterogeneity thus leads to an expansion of the gridlock interval.  If, by contrast all new member 
states have ideal policies between the pivotal member states and QMV is used, the gridlock 
interval decreases and legislative activity rises.  Our theory hence predicts that EU enlargement 
has an impact on legislative activity only insofar as it affects the gridlock interval. 
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Table 1. Evolution of the EU’s Legislative Decision-Making Rules 
 
Treaty period Legislative  Rule change  Start date Decision-making rules 
   Procedure   Commission 
(majority) 
Council 
(QMV unless stated) 
Parliament 
(majority) 
Rome  Consultation (U) New treaty 1 January 1958 5 of 9 6 states (unanimity) 72 of 142 MEPs 
    Enlargement 1 January 1973 7 of 13 9 states (unanimity) 100 of 198 MEPs 
  EP elected 1 July 1979 7 of 13 9 states (unanimity) 206 of 410 MEPs 
  Enlargement 1 January 1981 8 of 14 10 states (unanimity) 218 of 434 MEPs 
  Enlargement 1 January 1986 9 of 17 12 states (unanimity) 260 of 518 MEPs 
Single European Act Consultation (Q) New treaty 1 July 1987 9 of 17 54 of 76 votes 260 of 518 MEPs 
Maastricht Codecision New treaty 1 November 1993 9 of 17 54 of 76 votes 260 of 518 MEPs 
    EP reapportionment 1 July 1994 9 of 17 54 of 76 votes 284 of 567 MEPs 
  Enlargement 1 January 1995 11 of 20 62 of 87 votes 314 of 626 MEPs 
Amsterdam  Codecision New treaty 2 October 1997 11 of 20 62 of 87 votes 314 of 626 MEPs 
Nice   Codecision New treaty 1 February 2003 8 of 15 62 of 87 votes 314 of 626 MEPs 
    Enlargement 1 May 2004 13 of 25 88 of 124 votes 395 of 788 MEPs 
  EP reapportionment 1 July 2004 13 of 25 88 of 124 votes 367 of 732 MEPs 
  QMV weights 1 November 2004 13 of 25 232 of 321 votes 367 of 732 MEPs 
  Enlargement 1 January 2007 14 of 27 255 of 345 votes 393 of 785 MEPs 
  EP reapportionment 1 July 2009 14 of 27 255 of 345 votes 369 of 736 MEPs 
Lisbon  Codecision New treaty 1 December 2009 14 of 27 255 of 345 votes 369 of 736 MEPs 
    Enlargement (expected) 1 July 2013 15 of 28 260 of 352 votes 375 of 748 MEPs 
  EP reapportionment 1 July 2014 15 of 28 260 of 352 votes 376 of 751 MEPs 
  QMV weights 1 November 2014 15 of 28 55% states + 65% pop’n 376 of 751 MEPs 
 
Note:  Changes to the decision-making rules in the Commission, the Council, or the EP are indicated in bold.  Consultation (U) is the consultation 
procedure with unanimity in the Council.  Consultation (Q) is the is the consultation procedure with QMV in the Council.
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Empirical Analysis  
To test these ideas we developed a method for calculating the size of the gridlock interval in the 
EU legislative institutions in a particular period, and then looked at the relationship between the 
size of this interval and the number of EU laws adopted.  Formally, in our theory the location of 
the status quo on a particular policy issue, and whether this point is inside or outside the gridlock 
interval, should predict whether the policy can or cannot be changed in a particular period.  One 
possible empirical operationalization of this would be to look the expected location of policy 
status quos in a particular period, and to see whether these policies are moved into the gridlock 
interval in a period.  Such an operationalization is very difficult in any context (cf. Krehbiel 
1998).  There are also good reasons why the volume of legislation in a particular period is a 
reasonable way of testing our theory in the EU context. 
First, because much of the period we are looking at relates to new EU policies and the 
building of the single market, policy status quo points are not likely to be limited to particular 
parts of the policy space, which are then freed-up when the gridlock interval changes.  Existing 
policy status quos are likely to be reasonably evenly distributed on a left-right dimension because 
some EU policies lead to de-regulation of existing standards whereas other EU policies lead to 
the adoption of new regulatory standards. 
Second, because of the way EU decision-making works and because of the different 
electoral timetables of the EU member states and the EU institutions, it is impossible to identify a 
periods in EU politics where the gridlock interval is fixed for a sufficiently long period of time 
for all existing policies outside this interval to be moved into the gridlock interval.  Specifically, 
it would not be reasonable to treat each six-month period, or each year, or each European 
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Parliament term, or each Commission term as a clear ‘period’ where all status quo from outside a 
set gridlock interval are likely to be brought into the interval in that period.   
Instead, what we can assume is that the size of the gridlock interval in a particular period 
in the EU has an influence on the ability of the EU institutions to adopt policy at that time, all 
other things being equal.  So, for simplicity, our dependent variable is the number of legislative 
acts adopted by the EU in a six-month period between July 1979 and June 2009.8  A six-month 
period is a more appropriate unit of analysis than a calendar year because of the six-monthly 
rotating presidency of the Council and because the European Parliament is elected in June every 
five years.  We calculated the number of legislative acts adopted in each period from Frank 
Häge’s (2011) EUPOL dataset.9  And, as a robustness check we use König, Luetgert and 
Dannwolf’s (2006) alternative measure of EU legislative activity, which covers the 1984 to 2002 
period.10 
To calculate the size of the gridlock interval in a six-month period we proceeded as 
follows.  First, we identified the main decision-making rules that apply in each six-month period, 
as described above and in Table 1.  In most of these periods, several different rules are used at the 
same time.  For example, during the period of the SEA, the cooperation and the consultation 
procedure were used for different policy issues, and under the period of the Maastricht Treaty, the 
codecision and consultation procedures were used for different policy issues.  Also, in most 
periods, some legislation is adopted by unanimity in the Council while other legislation is 
adopted by qualified-majority voting, depending on the legislative procedure. 
To test our model, though, we need to make an assumption about the main procedural 
rules used in each period, and we use the procedures as shown in Table 1.  As a robustness check, 
we also test whether the results hold if we assume that cooperation rather than consultation was 
the main procedure during the period of the SEA.  Nevertheless, by making this assumption, we 
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introduce a certain measurement error, which reduces the likelihood that we will find significant 
results. 
Second, having identified the procedures used in each six-month period, which in turn 
determines the pivotal actors under each procedure, we then calculated the location of each of the 
actors.  Here, again, we make a simplifying assumption, and assume that these actors are located 
on a left-right policy dimension.  This is not an unreasonable simplification.  There is some 
evidence that the left-right dimension is present in roll-call voting in the Council (e.g. Mattila 
2004, Hagemann 2007), and considerable evidence that the left-right is the dominant dimension 
of roll-call voting in the European Parliament (e.g. Hix et al. 2006).  Nevertheless, most scholars 
of EU politics assume that the EU policy-space is multi-dimensional, and there is considerable 
evidence of this (e.g. Hix and Høyland 2012).  For example, expert interviews on the locations of 
actors in EU decision-making has found that actors’ positions in the Council correlate with 
underlying pro/anti-integration preferences or EU budget contributions (e.g. Thomson et al.  
2004, 2006, Thomson 2011; Zimmer et al. 2005).   
However, we estimate actors’ positions on a single left-right dimension for several 
reasons.  Measuring the gridlock interval in more than one dimension is a non-trivial exercise, 
and would introduce a further level of complexity when interpreting the empirical results. Also, 
estimates of EU actors’ positions on a pro-/anti-Europe dimension cover a shorter time period and 
are less reliable than estimates of actors’ positions on a left-right dimension.  And, most EU 
legislation since 1979 has related to the creation and regulation of the single market, which 
suggests that it is reasonable to assume that politicians’ preferences on many EU policies (such as 
environmental standards or social standards) are influenced by their underlying left-right policy 
preferences.  Yet, if EU policy-making is in fact multidimensional, assuming that it is un-
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dimension introduces measurement error, which hence reduces the likelihood that we will find 
significant results by making this simplifying assumption. 
To calculate the positions of actors on the left-right dimension we start with the 
information on party and government positions in Döring and Manow’s (2010) ParlGov dataset.11  
Döring and Manow use ‘expert judgment’ data on the left-right policy locations of parties from a 
range of sources to estimate the left-right position of each political party in the EU across time on 
a 0 to 10 left-right scale (Castles and Mair 1984, Huber and Inglehart 1995, Ray 1999, Benoit and 
Laver 2006, Steenbergen and Marks 2007, Hooghe et al.  2010).  From the positions of the 
political parties, the position of each government in the Council was calculated as the average 
position of the parties in a government, weighted by the share of the parliamentary seats of the 
parties in government.  From these data we then calculated the location of the pivotal and extreme 
governments in the Council on the left-right dimension in each six-month period.   
For the Commission, we assumed that each Commissioner was located at the same 
position on the left-right dimension as the national party to which he or she belonged.  We do not 
believe that each Commissioner has exactly the same positions as his or her party.  Nevertheless, 
because almost all Commissioners are career party politicians it is not unreasonable to assume 
that the left-right location of a Commissioner’s national party is correlated with the 
Commissioner’s position on this dimension.  From these data we then worked out the location of 
the median Commissioner on the left-right dimension in each six-month period. 
For the European Parliament, we assumed that each MEP has the same left-right position 
as his or her national party.  We then calculated the median member of each political group in the 
European Parliament and then identified the median political group on the left-right dimension in 
each six-month period, and used this as the left-right location of a majority in the European 
Parliament in a particular period. 
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Figure 3. Illustration of the Gridlock Intervals 
 
 
From the left-right positions of the key member states and the median members of the 
European Parliament and the Commission we then calculated the size of the gridlock interval in 
each six-month period between July 1979 and June 2009.  For this we followed the inferences of 
the theoretical model.  This is illustrated in Figure 3.  So, for the period of the Rome Treaty, 
when legislation was adopted by consultation and unanimity, the gridlock interval was the set 
[p1,pn] of policies between the extreme left and right governments.   
For the period of the SEA, when we assume that most legislation was passed under the 
consultation and QMV, the gridlock interval was the set [min{pa,pc},max{pb,pc}] between the 
position of the left pivotal government in the Council or the Commission and the position of the 
right pivotal government in the Council or the Commission.12  As a robustness check we also 
calculate gridlock intervals for the period of the SEA assuming that the cooperation procedure 
was the main decision-making procedure.  Under this procedure the European Parliament had a 
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between the furthest left of three actors – the Commission, the European Parliament, and the left 
pivotal government in the Council  – and the furthest right of three actors – the Commission, the 
European Parliament, and the right pivotal government.  So, in the hypothetical example in 
Figure 3, the gridlock interval under the consultation procedure is the distance between pc and pb, 
and under the cooperation procedure is the distance between pc and pp. 
For the period following the Maastricht Treaty, when we assume that most legislation was 
adopted by the codecision procedure, the gridlock interval was the set [min{pa,pp}, max{pb,pp}] of 
policies between the left pivotal government in the Council or the European Parliament and the 
right pivotal government in the Council or the European Parliament.  As a robustness check we 
also calculate gridlock intervals for the period after the Maastricht Treaty assuming that the 
Commission had gatekeeping power.  In this case, the gridlock interval in this period was as 
under the cooperation procedure.  So, in the hypothetical example in Figure 3, the gridlock 
interval under the codecision procedure without Commission gatekeeping is the distance between 
pa and pp, and under the codecision procedure with Commission gatekeeping is the distance 
between pc and pp. 
Finally, in the statistical analysis we include a number of control variables that are often 
broached to influence the volume of legislation adopted by the EU in a given period.  As 
discussed, we predict that these variables should not have an impact on legislative activity 
independently of their effects on the size of the gridlock interval.  First, the No. of member states 
is simply a count of the number of EU member states in a six-month period, which ranges from 9 
in July 1979 to 27 in June 2009.   
Second, the variable EP cycle captures the point in the term of a European Parliament, 
where the first six-month period in a parliamentary term takes the value 1, the second six-month 
period takes the value 2, and so on until the final six-month period before a European Parliament 
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election which takes the value 10.  This variable captures an effect identified by the European 
Parliament’s research division, where there is an increase in legislative activity across a 
parliamentary term (European Parliament 2009).  Fewer laws tend to be passed at the beginning 
of a parliamentary term because the process of forming political groups and committees delays 
the passage of legislation.  Then, towards the end of a parliamentary term, the Commission and 
the Council try to get as many laws passed as possible before the European Parliament breaks for 
the election period and the formation of the new Parliament.   
Third, the variable Part year captures whether a six-month period is the first half of a year 
(coded 0) or the second half of a year (coded 1).  This variable accounts for the agenda of the EU, 
where annual budgetary issues, for example, are usually resolved in the second half of a year. 
Fourth, the variable Big state presidency equals 1 if one of the larger member states 
(Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, or Spain) held the six-monthly rotating presidency of 
the Council, and 0 otherwise.  This variable consequently controls for the possibility that the 
larger EU states are able to push through more legislation during their period at the helm of the 
Council than smaller states are. 
Fifth, the variable EU public support captures the changing level of support for the EU 
over time.  If the EU institutions respond to the ‘policy mood’ of the public, one might expect the 
EU to adopt more legislation when public support for the EU is higher and less legislation when 
public support is lower.  Indeed, Franklin and Wlezian (1997) and Toshkov (2011) find a 
relationship between more public support for the EU and more legislative action by the EU, at 
least until the 1990s.  This is similar to Eriksson et al.’s claim about the effect of the policy mood 
of the US public on the activities of the US Congress (Eriksson et al.  2006).  For this variable we 
use the ‘membership’ question in the Eurobarometer (EB) survey from a particular period (Spring 
EBs for January-June, and Autumn EBs for July-December), and identify the (weighted) 
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percentage of people in the EU who regard their country’s membership of the EU as a ‘good 
thing’ in the six-month period before the six-month period of observation – to take account of a 
likely ‘lag’ effect of public opinion on the EU institutions.  We use the Mannheimer EB Trend 
File for all periods up to Spring 2002, and each separate EB datafile for all periods since August 
2002. 
Sixth, the variable Before enlargement captures the likely effect of the final six-month 
period before a new member state or group of member states joined the EU.  This takes account 
of the fact that the oft-observed fact that EU tried to pass a lot of legislation before the two 
enlargements to the central and eastern European states in the 2000s, perhaps with the expectation 
by the Commission and some of the existing EU member states that some legislative acts might 
be more difficult to pass in an enlarged Council. 
Finally, in some models we include dummy variables for each separate institutional 
period.  The variable Rome captures the period of the Treaty of Rome, and is coded 1 from the 
start of the dataset until January-June 1987, and 0 thereafter.  The variable SEA captures the 
period of the SEA, and is coded 1 from the July-December 1987 period until the July-December 
1993 period, and 0 otherwise.  And, the variable Maastricht+ captures the effect of the entry into 
force of Maastricht Treaty, and is coded 1 from the January-June 1994 period until the end of the 
data, and 0 otherwise.  These dummy variables account for the increasing policy competences of 
the EU as a result of each of these treaty reforms.  Related to this, our theory predicts that 
legislative activity decreases over time, but that the deepening of the EU that results from the 
SEA and the Maastricht Treaty leads to an increase in EU legislation. 





To get a sense of some of the patterns in the data, Figure 4 shows the locations of the pivotal 
actors in the EU across our thirty-year period.  The gap between the extreme left and right 
governments in the 1980s was considerable.  After the entry into force of the SEA in 1987, the 
two relevant actors in the Council shifted closer together, because the identity of these actors 
changed from the two extreme governments to the two pivotal governments as a result of the 
change form unanimity to QMV.  The pivotal governments in the Council then became very close 
together in the late 1990s, as a result of a shift to the left in a large number of member states.  The 
gap between the two pivotal governments grew again in the early 2000s.  The European 
Parliament and the Commission, meanwhile, were between the two pivotal governments in the 
Council in most periods, except between 1989 and 1996, when the European Parliament shifted 
considerably to the left, for short periods in 1995-96 and 2002-04, when the median 
Commissioner was further to the left than both pivotal governments, and between 1999 and 2000, 
with the European Parliament was briefly to the right of the pivotal governments in the Council. 
How these shifting positions affected the size of the gridlock interval is illustrated in 
Figure 5, as shown by the red line (on the inverted left-hand scale).  In general, the gridlock 
interval was larger under the Rome Treaty, much smaller under the SEA, and then shifted 
considerably during the period following the Maastricht Treaty, and was at its smallest between 
1997 and 2000.  As Figure 5 also shows, the volume of legislation adopted by the EU appears to 
broadly follow the changes in the gridlock interval sizes, as shown by the blue line (on the right-
hand scale), although with much higher variation. 
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Figure 4. Locations of the Pivotal Actors in EU Decision-Making 
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Table 2 presents the main results.13  The size of the gridlock interval is statistically 
significant in all model specifications.  Specifically, the bigger the gridlock interval, the less 
legislation the EU has passed.  In model 1, for example, the size of the gridlock interval alone 
explains about 18 per cent of the variance in the volume of legislation adopted by the EU.  In 
addition, a one-unit increase in the size of the gridlock interval (measured on a 10-point scale) 
corresponds to 14 fewer pieces of legislation passed by the EU in a six-month period. 
 
Table 2. Gridlock Interval and Number of Laws Adopted: Main Results 
 

































SEA  33.53** 
(12.07) 
   
Maastricht+  -2.77 
(11.47) 
   
Observations 60 60 44 47 52 
Adjusted R-squared 0.179 0.389 0.084 0.074 0.571 
 
Note: Dependent variable = number of laws adopted by the EU in a six-month period, between 1979 and 2009.  OLS 
regression.  Standard errors in parentheses.  In model 2, the Rome period is the baseline.  * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05,  
*** p ≤ 0.01. 
 
As model 2 shows, moreover, the size of the gridlock interval remains significant even 
when controlling for the changes to the decision-making rules, as represented by the SEA and 
Maastricht+ variables.  Adding these two dummy variables controls for all periods after the 
extension of QMV in the Single European Act.  Even with these variables included, a larger 
gridlock interval leads to fewer legislative acts adopted.  Also, as models 3, 4 and 5 show, 
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dropping one or other of the three institutional periods does not affect the general result.  In other 
words, changes in the size of the gridlock interval within in each institutional period influences, 
as a result of the changing policy positions of the pivotal actors in the EU institutions, influences 
the volume of legislation adopted by the EU. 
 
Table 3. Gridlock Interval and Number of Laws Adopted: With Controls 
 (1) (6) (7a) (7b) (8) (9) 
 All 
periods 
































































































Observations 60 60 44 44 47 29 
Adjusted R-squared 0.179 0.347 0.339 0.324 0.066 0.564 
 
Note: Dependent variable = number of laws adopted by the EU in a six-month period, between 1979 and 2009.  OLS 
regression.  Standard errors in parentheses.  * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the same models, but this time with the full set of control variables.  Model 
1, from Table 2, is included here for comparison.  As model 6 shows, the size of the gridlock 
interval is still highly significant, and the magnitude of the effect hardly changes, despite 
controlling for a number of other factors.  Dropping each period separately only affects the results 
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when the Rome period is dropped.  However, if the No. of member states variable is excluded, the 
gridlock interval is then significant even when Rome is excluded.  This is because the number of 
member states is moderately correlated (at 0.49) with the size of the gridlock interval after the 
move to QMV in 1987. 
Regarding the other variables, the difference between the first and second halves of a year 
is not significant.  Also, less legislation tended to be adopted when one of the big member states 
held the Council Presidency, although this is not significant in all models.  In contrast, more laws 
have been adopted towards the end of a term of the European Parliament, at least since the SEA.  
Furthermore, since the SEA higher public support for the EU had correlated with more legislative 
action, as others have found. 
Table 4. Robustness Checks 
 No. of laws  
adopted using  
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Observations 38 48 60 60 60 60 
Adj. R-sq. 0.199 0.291 0.331 0.365 0.339 0.318 
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Note: Dependent variable = number of laws adopted by the EU in a six-month period, between 1979 and 2009.  OLS 
regression.  Standard errors in parentheses.  * p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. 
. 
Table 4 shows a series of robustness checks.  First, model 10 uses an alternative 
dependent variable, based on König et al.’s (2006) measure of the number of laws adopted by the 
EU between 1984 and 2002.  The results are identical to the results using the Häge data, for the 
longer time period.   
Second, model 11 uses an alternative measure for the key independent variable, based on 
estimates of left-right party positions from coding party manifestos rather than from expert 
judgments.  The data for this variable were put together from the Döring and Manow (2010) 
ParlGov dataset and the Warntjen et al.  (2008) dataset.  The data covers the period from July 
1979 until June 2003, and the gridlock interval scale goes from -100 on the left to +100 on the 
right.  Once again, the results hold: a larger gridlock interval, as measured by party positions on a 
left-right scale, corresponds with fewer legislative acts. 
Third, models 12 and 13 look at two alternative conceptions of the operation of the 
legislative rules.  Model 12 assumes that most legislation in the period of the SEA was adopted 
by the cooperation procedure, while model 13 assumes that the Commission had a gatekeeping 
right under the codecision procedure.  These different assumptions, which lead to slightly 
different ways of measuring the size of the gridlock intervals since the SEA, produce identical 
results to the main results in Tables 2 and 3. 
Model 14 tests König’s (2007) approach, which focuses only on the level of conflict in the 
Council, by assuming that the gridlock interval is the distance between the policy positions of the 
two pivotal governments in the Council.  The basic result holds: that the size of the gridlock 
interval – in the Council only, this time – is negatively related to the number of legislative acts 
adopted in a six-month period.  Interestingly, though, the magnitude of the coefficient on the 
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gridlock interval variable is smaller in model 14 than in models 6, 12, and 13, which are the 
alternative definitions of the gridlock interval which include the locations and powers of the 
European Parliament and/or Commission.  This suggests that the preferences of the EU’s 
supranational institutions do influence EU legislative outcomes over and above the preferences of 
the pivotal member states in the Council.  This is an interesting result given the fact that the 
European Parliament and/or the Commission were located outside the interval between the two 
pivotal member states in the Council in only 19 of the 60 periods we look at, as Figure 1 shows.  
The results suggest, though, that this was enough to make a difference.  Put another way, less 
legislation was adopted in the early 1990s because the median MEP was to the left of the pivotal 
governments in the Council (under QMV) than would have been the case had the European 
Parliament not had power under the codecision procedure. 
Finally, model 15 looks at the effect of the gridlock interval on the volume of legislation 
proposed by the Commission.  The result suggests that the Commission is strategic when 
considering legislative proposals, in that it proposed less (more) legislation when the gridlock 
interval was larger (smaller).  However, the magnitude of the relationship between the size of the 
gridlock interval and the volume of legislation proposed is smaller than the magnitude of the 
relationship between the size of the gridlock interval and the volume of legislation adopted.  
Interestingly, though, the results on some of the control variables are different in this model than 
in the other models.  Particularly, whereas the effect of the European Parliament election cycle 
influences the volume of legislation adopted it has no effect on the volume of legislation 
proposed.  Also, whereas a big member state holding the Council Presidency has a negative effect 
on the volume of legislation adopted, a big member state holding the Council Presidency has a 





Intuitively one might think that enlargement of the EU from 6 to 27 member states and changes to 
the procedural rules which have added the European Parliament as a veto-player have made it 
more difficult for the EU to adopt policy.  Our theory challenges these intuitions.  As in other 
multi-actor legislative environments, such as the United States presidential system or in coalition 
governments in parliamentary systems, the ability to adopt legislation depends on the preferences 
of the key actors, the rules governing the relative powers of these actors, and the location of 
existing polices.  These factors together determine the size of the set of policies that can be 
adopted, and conversely the size of the set of policies that cannot be adopted: the gridlock 
interval.  In our approach, the number of actors or the decision-making rules only affect policy 
outcomes in so far as they influence the relative size of the gridlock interval.   
In the EU context, for example, the shift from consultation to the codecision procedure 
after 1993 essentially involved replacing the Commission with the European Parliament as a 
pivotal actor, in addition to the two pivotal governments in the Council under QMV.  
Furthermore, in each of the three institutional periods of the EU – before 1987, between 1987 and 
1993, and since 1993 – the size of the gridlock interval changed significantly as the relative 
preferences of the Commission, the European Parliament, and the pivotal member states changed.  
So, for example, the large volume of legislation adopted by the EU in the late 1980s was a result 
of the combined effect of the new institutional rules introduced by the SEA (such as QMV in the 
Council) and the relatively close positions of the pivotal actors in the institutions at that time.  Put 
another way, the effect of Jacques Delors was at least in part due to the fortuitous institutional 
and political context during his Presidency of the Commission. 
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Our empirical analysis of EU legislative activity between 1979 and 2009 supports this 
perspective.  We find compelling evidence that as the gridlock interval in the EU increased 
(decreased) from one six-month period to the next, the legislative activity of the EU decreased 
(increased).  For example, a decline in the size of the gridlock interval in the late 1990s, as a 
result of a shift to the center-left across the EU at that time, corresponded to an increase in the 
legislative activity in the EU.  Then, in the early 2000s, as the EU Council became more 
heterogeneous as center-right governments began to be elected and following the election of a 
center-right majority in the European Parliament, the gridlock interval increased and the 
legislative activity of the EU consequently declined. 
Moreover, these results are perhaps surprising given the simplification assumptions we 
need to make in the empirical estimation – about the uni-dimensionality of EU politics and the 
use of a single main legislative procedure in each period.  Given the inevitable errors in the 
measurement of our key independent variable which result from these simplifications, the 
magnitude of our key results are probably at the lower bound of the true relationship between 
gridlock size and EU legislative outputs. 
Finally, our theory also suggests that the EU should adopt particular types of policies in 
particular periods.  So, if the pivotal actors are close together on the center-left, as they were in 
the late 1990s, the EU should not only adopt more policy, but should also move existing policy 
status quos on a leftward direction.  Conversely, if the pivotal actors are close together on the 
center-right, as they were in the late 2000s, the EU should once again adopt more policy than in 
the early 2000s when the gridlock interval was larger, but should also move existing policy status 
quos in a rightward direction.  Hence, building on our theory and evidence, future research could 
look at how the substantive content of EU policy has changed over time in response to the size of 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
Laws adopted (Häge) 60 114.95 28.95 70 183 
Laws proposed (Häge) 60 116.55 26.19 78 189 
Laws adopted (König et al.) 38 95.03 34.86 27 177 
Gridlock interval (ParlGov) 60 2.65 0.89 1.02 4.25 
Gridlock interval, SEA=cooperation (ParlGov) 60 2.68 0.87 1.02 4.25 
Gridlock interval, Com=gatekeeper (ParlGov) 60 2.68 0.89 1.02 4.25 
Gridlock interval, Council only (ParlGov) 60 2.62 0.91 0.96 4.25 
Gridlock interval (party manifestos) 48 31.62 18.70 9.07 66.37 
No. of member states 60 14.80 5.43 9 27 
EP cycle 60 5.50 2.90 1 10 
Part year 60 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Big state presidency 60 0.38 0.49 0 1 
EU public support 60 54.17 6.04 44.62 69.99 







                                                
1 The gridlock interval is distinct from, but related to the winset of the status quo. The winset is the set of 
policies that can beat the status quo in the legislative process. It is empty if the status quo is in the gridlock 
interval. We focus on the gridlock interval rather than the winset, because we are interested in the level of 
legislative activity. If the location of the status quo is uniformly distributed over the policy space, the 
relative size of the gridlock interval measures for what proportion of status quos no legislative activity 
occurs. By contrast, the size of the winset does not give any indication of the extent of legislative activity, 
beyond whether there can be legislative activity for a specific status quo or not.   
2 Multi-dimensional models of policy making would lead to similar conclusions.  Commission proposals 
would need to satisfy the same conditions to be adopted.  The analysis would be more intricate, however, 
because the pivotal member states, MEPs and Commissioners would be different depending on the 
direction of policy change considered.  There would thus be more relevant actors.  The graphical 
representation of multi-dimensional models of policy making would also be more complicated.  For the 
purposes of our analysis no additional insights would be gained, however. 
3 The Commission typically tries to reach consensus, but uses simple majority rule if it fails to reach 
consensus. The prospect of a simple majority vote thus determines consensus agreements.  The European 
Parliament uses absolute majority rule in some instances.  A majority of its members then need to vote in 
favor rather than a mere majority of the voting members.  Participation rates have increased over the 
years, however, and as this trend continues the absolute majority requirement becomes equivalent to a 
simple majority rule (e.g. Hix et al. 2007).  For these reasons assuming simple majority voting in the 
Commission and European Parliament seems reasonable. 
4 More precisely, a qualified majority currently consists of: (1) 255 out of 345 votes; (2) from a majority 
of member states; (3) representing at least 62 percent of EU population.  For simplicity, we ignore 
conditions (2) and (3), but this has no effect on the conclusions.  The member states receive votes based 
on population, with the largest states getting 29 votes and the smallest having three.  Under the provisions 
of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty the qualified majority rule will change with the accession of Croatia to the EU 
in 2013, and again in 2014.   
5 In reality codecision starts with a Commission proposal. We ignore the first steps of the procedure, 
however, as they are irrelevant for the purpose of determining the gridlock interval, because the European 
Parliament can disregard them when it proposes its joint text. Also, we assume that only the European 
Parliament can propose a joint text, whereas member states can do so too in reality.  This assumption does 
not affect our conclusions either. 
6 We assume that the Commission does not have gatekeeping rights throughout the paper, unless explicitly 
mentioned. If the Commission has gatekeeping rights it will chose an issue only if that choice increases its 
utility.  Gridlock then occurs if there are no issues that lead to an increase in the Commission’s utility, if 
chosen.  If the Commission does not have gatekeeping rights, its best choice may be the issue that lowers 
its utility the least.  For an analysis of gatekeeping rights, see Crombez, Groseclose and Krehbiel (2006). 
7 The only difference is that a change in one member state’s preferences may result in more than one 
pivotal or extreme member state having different preferences.  For example, if the most leftist member 
state moves all the way to the other extreme, the preferences of both extreme member states are different 
after the change, and the preferences of both pivotal member states may be different as well. 
8 In each 6-month period the EU adopts many laws under a variety of different legislative procedures.  
However, we decided to use a simple aggregate measure of the total number of legislative acts adopted as 
we felt that any decision regarding what to count or not to count as a legislative act adopted under the 
procedure we focus on in a particular period would be relatively arbitrary.  As a result, because our 
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dependent variable is a ‘noisy’ indicator, our results are likely to be at the lower bound of statistical 
significance. 
9 See http://frankhaege.eu/data/eupol.   
10 The König et al. data is more complete than Häge’s data on issues like the voting procedure used in the 
Council on a particular legislative issue.  However, this difference between the two datasets is not relevant 
for our research because we only use the datasets to measure the number of pieces of legislation adopted 
in each 6-month period. 
11 See http://parlgov.org.   
12 We ignore the most extreme member states under the SEA, because their location affects the gridlock 
interval under consultation and QMV only if the Commission is more extreme than them.  According to 
all measures used, however, the Commission was located between them under the SEA. 
13 We present OLS regression results for ease of interpretation of the results.  As a robustness check, we 
also estimated the models in Tables 2, 3 and 4 with negative binomial regression, and the results are 
identical. 
